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Abstract
Many-to-Many Invocation (M2MI) is a new paradigm for building
secure collaborative systems that run in true ad hoc networks of fixed
and mobile computing devices. M2MI is useful for building a broad
range of systems, including service discovery frameworks; groupware
for mobile ad hoc collaboration; systems involving networked devices
(printers, cameras, sensors);  and collaborative middleware systems.
M2MI provides an object oriented method call abstraction based on
broadcasting.  An M2MI invocation means ``every object out there that
implements this interface, call this method.’’  M2MI is layered on top
of a new messaging protocol, the Many-to-Many Protocol (M2MP),
which broadcasts messages to all nearby devices using the wireless
network's inherent broadcast nature instead of routing messages from
device to device.  In an M2MI-based system, central servers are not
required; network administration is not required; complicated,
resource-consuming ad hoc routing protocols are not required; and
system development and deployment are simplified.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a new paradigm, Many-to-Many Invocation (M2MI), for
building secure collaborative systems that run in true ad hoc networks of fixed and
mobile computing devices. M2MI is useful for building a broad range of systems,
including service discovery frameworks; groupware for mobile ad hoc collaboration;
We also address encryption and decryption of M2MI method invocations and a
describe a decentralized key management in ad hoc networks.
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M2MI provides an object oriented method call abstraction based on broadcasting.  An
M2MI-based application broadcasts method invocations, which are received and
performed by many objects in many target devices simultaneously. An M2MI
invocation means ``Everyone out there that implements this interface, call this
method.'' The calling application does not need to know the identities of the target
devices ahead of time, does not need to explicitly discover the target devices, and
does not need to set up individual connections to the target devices.  The calling
device simply broadcasts method invocations, and all objects in the proximal network
that implement those methods will execute them.
As a result, M2MI offers these key advantages over existing systems:
• M2MI-based systems do not require central servers; instead, applications run
collectively on the proximal devices themselves.
• M2MI-based systems do not require network administration to assign addresses
to devices, set up routing, and so on, since method invocations are broadcast to
all nearby devices.  Consequently,
• M2MI is well-suited for an ad hoc networking environment where central servers
may not be available and devices may come and go unpredictably.
• M2MI-based systems allow to decrypt an encrypt method invocations using
session keys [9].
• M2MI-based systems do not need complicated ad hoc routing protocols that
consume memory, processing, and network bandwidth resources [10].
Consequently,
• M2MI is well-suited for small mobile devices with limited resources and battery
life.
• M2MI simplifies system development in several ways. By using M2MI's high-
level method call abstraction, developers avoid having to work with low-level
network messages.  Since M2MI does not need to discover target devices
explicitly or set up individual connections, developers need not write the code to
do all that.
• M2MI simplifies system deployment by eliminating the need for always-on
application servers, lookup services, code-base servers, and so on; by eliminating
the software that would otherwise have to be installed on all these servers; and by
eliminating the need for network configuration.
M2MI's key technical innovations are these:
• M2MI layers an object oriented abstraction on top of broadcast messaging, letting
the application developer work with high-level method calls instead of low-level
network messages.
• M2MI uses dynamic proxy synthesis to create remote method invocation proxies
(stubs and skeletons) automatically at run time - as opposed to existing remote
method invocation systems, which compile the proxies, offline and which must
deploy the proxies ahead of time.
This paper is organized as follows: the next chapter describes the target environment
for M2MI based systems; the following chapter discusses the M2MI paradigm
followed by a chapter showing how M2MI can be used to develop applications and
3service discovery frameworks. The last two chapters discuss a dynamic fault tolerant
key management system.
TARGET ENVIRONMNET
M2MI's target domain is ad hoc collaborative systems: systems where multiple users
with computing devices, as well as multiple standalone devices like printers, cameras,
and sensors, all participate simultaneously (collaborative); and systems where the
various devices come and go and so are not configured to know about each other
ahead of time (ad hoc).  Examples of ad hoc collaborative systems include:
• Applications that discover and use nearby networked services: a document
printing application that finds printers wherever the user happens to be, or a
surveillance application that displays images from nearby video cameras.
• Collaborative middleware systems like shared tuple spaces [1].
• Groupware applications: a chat session, a shared whiteboard, a group
appointment scheduler, a file  sharing application, or a multiplayer game.
In many such collaborative systems, every device needs to talk to every other device.
Every person's chat messages are displayed on every person's device; every person's
calendar on every person's device is queried and updated with the next meeting time.
In contrast to applications like email or web browsing (one-to-one communication) or
web-casting (one-to-many communication), the collaborative systems envisioned here
exhibit many-to-many communication patterns. M2MI is designed especially to
support applications with many-to-many communication patterns, although it also
supports other communication patterns.
Devices come and go as the system is running, the devices do not know each other’s
identities beforehand; instead, the devices form ad hoc networks among themselves.
M2MI is intended for running collaborative systems without central servers.  In a
wireless ad hoc network of devices, relying on servers in a wired network is
unattractive because the devices are not necessarily always in range of a wireless
access point.  Furthermore, relying on any one wireless device to act as a server is
unattractive because devices may come and go without prior notification.  Instead, all
the devices - whichever ones happen to be present in the changing set of proximal
devices - act in concert to run the system.
THE M2MI PARADIGM
Remote method invocation (RMI) [7] can be viewed as an object oriented abstraction
of point-to-point communication: what looks like a method call is in fact a message
sent and a response sent back.  In the same way, M2MI can be viewed as an object
oriented abstraction of broadcast communication.  This section describes the M2MI
paradigm at a conceptual level.
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Handles
M2MI lets an application invoke a method declared in an interface.  To do so, the
application needs some kind of ``reference'' upon which to perform the invocation.  In
M2MI, a reference is called a handle, and there are three varieties, omnihandles,
unihandles, and multihandles.
Omnihandles
An omnihandle for an interface stands for ``every object out there that implements
this interface.'' An application can ask the M2MI layer to create an omnihandle for a
certain interface X, called the omnihandle's target interface. (A handle can implement
more than one target interface if desired. An omnihandle for interface Foo; the
omnihandle is named allFoos is created by code like this:
Foo allFoos = M2MI.getOmnihandle(Foo.class);
Once an omnihandle is created, calling method doSomething on the omnihandle
for interface AnInterface means, ``Every object out there that implements
interface AnInterface, perform method doSomething.'' The method is actually
performed by whichever objects implementing interface AnInterface exist at the time
the method is invoked on the omnihandle.  Thus, different objects could respond to an
omnihandle invocationat different times. Three objects implementing interface Foo,
objects A, B, and D, happen to be in existence at that time; so all three objects
perform method y. Note that even though object D did not exist when the omnihandle
allFoos was created, the method is nonetheless invoked on object D.
The target objects invoked by an M2MI method call need not reside in the same
process as the calling object. The target objects can reside in other processes or other
devices.  As long as the target objects are in range to receive a broadcast from the
calling object over the network, the M2MI layer will find the target objects and
perform a remote method invocation on each one.
Exporting Objects
To receive invocations on a certain interface X, an application creates an object that
implements interface X and exports the object to the M2MI layer.  Thereafter, the
M2MI layer will invoke that object's method Y whenever anyone calls method Y on
an omnihandle for interface X.  An object is exported with code like this:
M2MI.export(b, Foo.class);
Foo.class is the class of the target interface through which M2MI invocations will
come to the object.  We say the object is ``exported as type Foo.'' M2MI also lets an
object be exported as more than one target interface.  Once exported, an object stays
exported until explicitly unexported:
5M2MI.unexport(b);
In other words, M2MI does not do distributed garbage collection (DGC).  In many
distributed collaborative applications, DGC is unwanted; an object that is exported by
one device as part of a distributed application should remain exported even if there are
no other devices invoking the object yet. In cases where DGC is needed, it can be
provided by a leasing mechanism explicit in the interface.
Unihandles
A unihandle for an interface stands for ``one particular object out there that
implements this interface.'' An application can export an object and have the M2MI
layer return a unihandle for that object.  Unlike an omnihandle, a unihandle is bound
to one particular object at the time the unihandle is created.  A unihandle is created by
code like this:
Foo b_Foo = M2MI.getUnihandle(b,Foo.class);
Once a unihandle is created, calling method Y on the unihandle means, ``The
particular object out there associated with this unihandle, perform method Y.'' When
the statement b_Foo.y(); is executed, only object B performs the method. As with an
omnihandle, the target object for a unihandle invocation need not reside in the same
process or device as the calling object.
A unihandle can be detached from its object, after which the object can no longer
be invoked via the unihandle:
b_Foo.detach();
Multihandles
A multihandle for an interface stands for ``one particular set of objects out there that
implement this interface.'' Unlike a unihandle which only refers to one object, a
multihandle can refer to zero or more objects.  But unlike an omnihandle which
automatically refers to all objects that implement a certain target interface, a
multihandle only refers to those objects that have been explicitly attached to the
multihandle.
The multihandle is named someFoos, and it is attached to two objects, A and D. The
multihandle is created and attached to the objects by code like this:
Foo someFoos = M2MI.getMultihandle(Foo.class);
someFoos.attach(a); someFoos.attach(d);
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Once a multihandle is created, calling method Y on the multihandle means, ``The
particular object or objects out there associated with this multihandle, perform method
Y.'' When the statement someFoos.y(); is executed, objects A and D perform the
method, but not objects B or C.  As with an omnihandle or unihandle, the target
objects for a multihandle invocation need not reside in the same process or device as
the calling object or each other.A multihandle can be created in one process and sent
to another process, and the destination process can then attach its own objects to the
multihandle.
An object can also be detached from a multihandle:
someFoos.detach(a);
M2MI-BASED SYSTEMS
This section gives one examples showing how M2MI can be used to design a chat
application and a print service discovery system. These examples show the elegance
of ad hoc  collaborative systems based on M2MI. Further examples can be found at
[4].
Service Discovery -  Printing
As an example of an M2MI-based system involving stand-alone devices providing
services, consider printing. To print a document from a mobile device, the user must
discover the nearby printers and print the document on one selected printer.  Printer
discovery is a two-step process: the user broadcasts a printer discovery request via an
omnihandle invocation; then each printer sends its own unihandle back to the user via
a unihandle invocation on the user.  To print the document, the user does an
invocation on the selected printer's unihandle.
Specifically, each printer has a print service object that implements this interface:
public interface PrintService {
    public void print(Document doc);
}
The printer exports its print service object to the M2MI layer and obtains a unihandle
attached to the object. The printer is now prepared to process document printing
requests.  To discover printers, there are two print discovery interfaces:
public interface PrintDiscovery {
   public void request(PrintClient client);
}
  public interface PrintClient {
7   public void report(PrintService printer,
String name);
}
The client printing application exports a print client object implementing interface
PrintClient to the M2MI layer and obtains a unihandle attached to the object.
The application also obtains from the M2MI layer an omnihandle for interface
PrintDiscovery.  The application is now prepared to make print discovery
requests and process print discovery reports.
Each printer exports a print discovery object implementing interface
PrintDiscovery to the M2MI layer.  The printer is now prepared to process print
discovery requests and generate print discovery reports
The application first calls
printDiscovery.request(theClient);
on an omnihandle for interface PrintDiscovery, passing in the unihandle to its
own print client object.  Since it is invoked on an omnihandle, this call goes to all the
printers.  The application now waits for print discovery reports.
Each printer's request method calls
theClient.report(thePrinter,
     "Printer Name");
The method is invoked on the print client unihandle passed in as an argument.  The
method call arguments are   the unihandle to the printer's print service object and the
name of the printer.  Since it is invoked on a unihandle, this call goes just to the
requesting client printing application, not to any other print clients that may be
present. After executing all the report invocations, the printing application knows the
name of each available printer and has a unihandle for submitting jobs to each printer.
Finally, after asking the user to select one of the printers, the application calls:
c_Printer.print(theDocument);
where c_Printer is the selected printer's unihandle as previously passed to the
report method.  Since it is invoked on a unihandle, this call goes just to the selected
printer, not the other printers.  The printer proceeds to print the document passed to
the print method.
Clearly, this invocation pattern of broadcast discovery request - discovery responses -
service usage can apply to any service, not just printing.  It is even possible to define a
generic service discovery interface that can be used to find objects that implement any
interface, the desired interface being specified as a parameter of the discovery method
invocation.
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M2MI ARCHITECTURE
Our initial work with M2MI has focused on networked collaborative systems.  In this
environment of ad hoc networks of proximal mobile wireless devices, M2MI is
layered on top of a new network protocol, M2MP.  We have implemented initial
versions  of M2MP and M2MI in Java. Are detailed description of the design and
architecture can be found at [4].
M2MI SECURITY
Providing security within M2MI-based systems is an area of current development.
We have identified these general security requirements:
• Confidentiality - Intruders who are not part of a collaborative system must not be
able to understand the contents of the M2MI invocations.
• Participant authentication - Intruders who are not authorized to participate in a
collaborative system must not be able to perform M2MI invocations in that
system.
• Service authentication - Intruders must not be able to masquerade as legitimate
participants in a collaborative system and accept M2MI invocations.  For
example, a client must be assured that a service claiming to be a certain printer
really is the printer that is going to print the client's job and not some intruder.
While existing techniques for achieving confidentiality and authentication work well
in an environment of fixed hosts, wired networks, these techniques will not work well
in an environment of mobile devices, wireless networks, and no central servers.
A decentralized key management is necessary n order to achieve the security
requirements.
DECENTRALIZED KEYMANAGEMENT IN AD HOC NETWORKD
State of the Art
Key management has been the thrust of several research initiatives in the  ad hoc
networking domain (e.g., [1, 6]  et al).  Each of these approaches seeks to establish a
public key infrastructure within the constraints of  ad hoc networks; each approach is
discussed below.
``Securing Ad Hoc Networks'' [10] was one of the first notable  publications to
propose a public key management service for ad hoc networks.  The service itself
encapsulates a public/private key pair K/k.  The private key, k, is used to sign other
nodes' public keys; the public key, K, is used to verify the signature.  The service
employs a (n, t+1) threshold scheme to distribute the private key and the digital
signing process among n nodes.  Each of the n nodes is denoted as a server node, as it
has a special role in the signing service.  Combiner nodes - which may be a subset of
the server nodes or altogether different nodes - are also required to combine each
server's partial signature.  For example, to sign a certificate, each of the n server nodes
9must generate a partial signature using its share of the private (k1, k2, … kn) to
compute a partial signature of the certificate.  Once generated, each server node sends
its partial signature to the combiner; the combiner then computes the entire signature.
To its credit [10]   was quite progressive at its inception, as its design is largely
proactive and capable of handling a dynamic network state.  Nonetheless, the service
has remnants of its wired predecessor, namely, a trusted authority, and specialized
server and combiner nodes.  Although the threshold scheme employed allows t < n
servers to be compromised without sacrificing the service, its largely centralized
approach encapsulates relatively few points of failure and attack.
``Providing Robust and Ubiquitous Security Support for Ad Hoc Networks [6]
presents a natural extension to [1], wherein the signing service is distributed to any
node n the network.  For example, if a network member requires a certificate, it need
only be in the proximity of any t+1 nodes.  The service  is otherwise similar to [6].
Despite the improved distribution, [6] still requires a trusted party at initialization.
Further, because any node in the network may participate in the sharing, a malicious
node may masquerade as t+1 bogus nodes and reconstruct the private key.
More recently, Hubaux et al have proposed a self organizing public key infrastructure
in [1].  Unlike the previous two publications, [1] does not require a trusted authority
or any specialized nodes; instead, each node issues its own certificates to other nodes.
Each node maintains a limited repository of other nodes' certificates.  When a node
wishes to validate a certificate of another node, the nodes combine their certificate
repositories; the validating node then examines the merged certificate repository for
falsified certificates.  If none are found, the certificate is accepted; otherwise it is
rejected.  The primary drawback of [1] is its initialization time.  In long-lived ad hoc
networks, such overhead may be admissable; it is likely to be prohibitive in more
transient settings.
Although each of the above paradigms is effective in its own right, they are all based
on a common assumption, namely, point-to-point communication.  Public key
infrastructures enable nodes with authentic public encryption keys that they may use
to establish secure communication with one another. However, many ad hoc networks
are collaborative, many-to-many environments. In these settings, public key
cryptography is computationally intensive, as each group message must be encrypted
n-1 times.  Group key management paradigms which provide a shared symmetric key
that is shared among all group members, have been used throughout the wired
networking domain to secure broadcast and many-to-many communication
environments; however, very few attempts have been made to adapt group key
management infrastructures to an ad hoc setting.
Dominant group key management paradigms include the well-known CLIQUES
project [8], Kim et al [5], and several others.  Each of  these  protocols is based on the
generalized Diffie-Hellman problem, which requires every network member to
contribute to the generation of the shared  group key.  Because they were developed
for wired environments, many of these approaches require point-to-point and
broadcast mediums, synchronous messaging, and static network topologies.
Unfortunately, the wireless, amorphous, transient, many-to-many nature of ad hoc
networks precludes many of the assumptions on which the above protocols were
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developed.  We, therefore, introduce a new approach to key management that can
effectively function within the constraints of an ad hoc network environment.
Looking Forward
The ad hoc network environment we envision is transient, dynamic in structure and
membership, proximal, and broadcast-based.  We also assume that network nodes
wish to collaborate, that is, our primary goal is to ensure secure  many-to-many
communication.  As a result, our paradigm is fully decentralized  (i.e., it lacks server
or otherwise specialized nodes), lightweight, and  best-suited for small, spontaneous
networks.  The first protocol we present is not authenticated; the second is an
extension of the first that includes authentication mechanisms.
The nucleus of our first protocol is a tuple-like entity, inspired by Gelerntner's tuples
in [2],  that is effectively a hash table shared among all members of the group. Each
member of the group has an entry in the hash table, which includes that member's
contribution to the group key.
The following atomic operations may be performed on the tuple:
• take() - removes the tuple from the space, such that no other group member may
modify its contents.
• read() - reads the current contents of the tuple
• write() - writes the tuple into the space, overwriting the previous tuple
Although the tuple spaces are often implemented as a centrally-based service, the
tuples used in this context are fully distributed: each member hosts its own entry in
the tuple. Nodes may host more than one entry if replication is desired in the interest
of availability.
Group Genesis
Group genesis requires two or more parties to be present.
1. Group members agree on a cyclic group,  G, of order q, and a generator, a in G;
each member then chooses a secret share, Ni  Œ G.
2. The first member, M1, instantiates a Tuple Space and places a new tuple in the
space.  The tuple initially contains Mi's contribution and the current cardinal
value.  Mi then sends a broadcast message to the group stating that tuple has been
created.
3. Upon receipt of the broadcast message, each member attempts to remove the
tuple from the space in order to add its contribution. Because take() request will
withdraw the tuple from the space; the other take() will block until the tuple is
returned to the space.  The member who receives the tuple then adds an entry in
the tuple for itself and updates all existing intermediate values and the cardinal
value.  This step is repeated until M2 … Mn-1 have written their contributions into
the tuple.
4. The last member of the group has special role in the key generation process.  The
last member is not pre-determined; it is simply the last member to send a take()
request. Mn first performs a take() operation on the tuple.  It then exponentiates
each intermediate value in the tuple with its secret exponent, Sn, and adds in an
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intermediate value for itself.  Unlike its predecessors, Mn does not update the
cardinal value, as the final cardinal value is the group key.  Instead, it writes the
tuple back into the space with the previous cardinal value and the updated
intermediate values. Mn then sends a broadcast message to the group, which
informs them of the termination of the key generation phase.
Upon receipt of the broadcast message, each member read()s its intermediate value
and uses it to compute the group key.
Member Addition – join()
A join() operation denotes the addition of a single group member. Semantics for join()
entail a modification of the group key, such that the new member's share is included
in the group key.  The steps required for join() follow.
1. Mn+1 take()s the tuple out of the space, adds its intermediate value, updates each
existing intermediate values, and write()s the tuple back into the space.
2. MGC performs a take() on the tuple, updates the cardinal value, write()s the tuple
back into the space, and notifies all group members that the key generation is
complete.
Following a join() operation, the new member becomes new group controller (i.e.,
Mn+1 = MGC).
By default, join does not ensure forward or backward secrecy.  In many scenarios, this
may be admissable; however, a simple extension to the join operation can ensure
forward and backward secrecy.  The revised protocol requires the existing group
controller, Mn, factor its secret, Sn out of the existing cardinal and intermediate values,
choose a new secret,  Sn, and exponentiate each intermediate value with it.
Member Removal - leave()
Leave entails the removal of a group member's contribution to the group key, thereby
prohibiting it from decrypting subsequent group messages.  The following protocol
assumes that the departure is voluntary. If the departure is not voluntary, the first step
is clearly omitted, however, the excluded member is still unable to derive the group
key.
1. The departing member, Mp, factors its contribution out of  each entry in the tuple.
2. The group controller, MGC, chooses a new secret SGC and exponentiates each
entry in the tuple with it.
Conclusion
We present a dynamic, fault--tolerant symmetric key management system.  Unlike
other key management paradigms, our approach does not require a specific order in
which contributions are collected, nor does it rely on a trusted or centralized entity to
combine the partial keys.
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